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Introduction
The improvement of energy ef ciency is often asserted to be one of the most promising options to reduce both the usage of energy and associated negative externalities, such as carbon dioxide emissions (CO 2 ). Ever since the creation of the Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) standards in 1975, this assertion has been a mainstay of energy policy in the United States. In recent years, it has also found increasing currency in Europe, as attested to by the voluntary agreement negotiated in 1999 between the European Commission (EC) and the European Automobile Manufacturers Association, stipulating the reduction of average emissions to a target level of 140g CO 2 /km by 2008. The EC is additionally considering legislation that would set a target of 120g CO 2 /km by 2012.
Although such technological standards undoubtedly confer bene ts via reduced per-unit prices of energy services, the extent to which they reduce energy consumption, and hence pollution, remains controversial. It is plausible, for instance, that the owner of a more fuel-ef cient car will ceteris paribus drive more in response to lower perkilometer traveling costs relative to other modes. This increase in service demand from reduced energy prices is called the rebound effect, alternatively referred to as take back of ef ciency improvements. KHAZZOOM (1980) was among the rst to study the rebound effect at the microeconomic level of households, focusing on the effects of increases in the energy ef ciency of a single energy service, such as space heating and individual conveyance. The rebound, however, is a general economic phenomenon, diminishing potential gains of time-saving technologies (e. g. BINSWANGER 2001) as well as of innovations that may reduce the usage of resources such as water.
The signi cance of the rebound has been hotly debated among energy economists ever since then see e. g. BINSWANGER (2001) , BROOKES (2000) , and GREENING et al. (2000) for surveys of the relevant literature. Though the basic mechanism is widely accepted, the core of the controversy lies in the identi cation of the magnitude of the direct rebound effect, which describes the increased demand for an energy service who-4 se price shrinks due to improved ef ciency 1 . This substitution mechanism in favor of the energy service works exactly as would the price reduction of any commodity other than energy, and suggests that price elasticities are at issue when it comes to the estimation of direct rebound effects. Some analysts, most notably LOVINS (1988) , maintain that these effects are so insigni cant that they can safely be ignored (see also GREENE 1992 and SCHIPPER and GRUBB 2000) . Other authors argue that they might be so large as to completely defeat the purpose of energy ef ciency improvements (BROOKES 1990 , SAUNDERS 1992 , WIRL 1997 .
Support for both views are found in the available empirical evidence. A survey by GOODWIN, DARGAY, and HANLY (2004) , for example, cites rebound effects varying between 4% and 89% from studies using pooled cross-section/time-series data. Results from subsequent studies are equally wide-ranging. Using cross-sectional micro data from the 1997 Consumer Expenditure Survey, WEST (2004) nds a rebound effect that is 87% on average, while SMALL and VAN DENDER (2007) , who use a pooled crosssection of US states for 1966-2001, uncover rebound effects varying between 2.2% and 15.3%. Aside from differences in the level of data aggregation, one major reason for the diverging results of the empirical studies is that there is no unanimous de nition of the direct rebound effect. Instead, several de nitions have been employed as determined by the availability of price and ef ciency data, making comparisons across studies dif cult. The resulting variety of de nitions used in the economic literature is summarized and analyzed in an illuminating way by DIMITROUPOULOS and SORRELL (2006) , who argue that it is particularly due to the omission of potentially relevant factors, such as capital cost, that the size of the rebound effect might be frequently overesti-
The indirect rebound effect and general equilibrium effects have also been distinguished in the literature (see, e. g. , GREENE 1997, GREENE et al. 1999 ). The former arises from an income effect: lower per-unit cost of an energy service implies -ceteris paribus -that real income grows. The latter arises from innovations, such as James WATT's famous steam engine, that increase society's aggregate income potential. Given that both indirect and general equilibrium effects are dif cult to quantify, the overwhelming majority of empirical studies con nes itself to analyzing the direct rebound effect. mated in empirical studies. GREENE, KAHN, and GIBSON (1999) and SMALL and VAN DENDER (2007) express similar reservations, noting in particular the shortcomings of cross-sectional or pooled approaches that fail to control for the time-invariant effects of neighborhood design, infrastructure, and other geographical features, which are likely to be strongly correlated with fuel economy and travel.
Departing from the theoretical grounds provided by BECKER's (1965) classical household production function approach and drawing on a panel of household travel data, this paper focuses on estimating the direct rebound effect from variation in the fuel economy of household vehicles. Several features distinguish our analysis. After cataloguing three commonly employed de nitions of the direct rebound effect in the theoretical section of the paper, econometric estimates corresponding to each of the three de nitions are provided in the empirical section. These estimates are generated from panel models of micro-level data, thereby bypassing aggregation problems while at the same time controlling for time-invariant omitted variables.
Our results, which range between 57% and 67%, indicate a rebound that is substantially larger than the typical effects obtained from the U.S. transport sector. Based on household survey data, GREENE, KAHN, and GIBSON(1999:1) , for instance, nd a long-run take back of about 20% of potential energy savings, con rming the results of other U.S. studies using national and or state-level data. While this issue has received relatively less scrutiny in the European context, our results are also substantially larger than those of WALKER and WIRL (1993) , who estimate a long-run rebound effect of 36% for Germany using aggregate time-series data.
The following section presents three de nitions of the direct rebound effect, building the basis for the empirical estimation. Section 3 describes the econometric specications and estimators. Section 4 describes the panel data base used in the estimation, followed by the presentation and interpretation of the results in Section 5. The last section summarizes and concludes. Along the lines of BECKER's seminal work on household production, we assume that an individual household derives utility from energy services, such as mobility or comfortable room temperature. A speci c service is taken to be the output of a production function f :
where f describes how households produce the service in the amount of s by using energy, e, time, t, capital, k, and other market goods o. Using this framework, we begin by drawing on the de nition of energy ef ciency typically employed in the economic literature (e. g. WIRL, 1997):
where the ef ciency parameter µ characterizes the technology with which a service is provided. For the speci c example of individual conveyance, parameter µ designates fuel ef ciency that can be measured in terms of vehicle kilometers per liter of fuel input and may alter, for instance, if a household changes its vehicle. Ef ciency de nition (2) assumes proportionality between service level and energy input regardless of the level a simplifying assumption that may not be true in general, but provides for a convenient rst-order approximation of the relationship of s with respect to e.
Ef ciency de nition (2) re ects the fact that the higher the ef ciency µ of a given technology, the less energy e = s/µ is required for the provision of a certain amount s of energy service. Hence, the concept of energy ef ciency is perfectly in line with BE-CKER's idea of household production, according to which households are, ultimately, not interested in the amount of energy required for a certain amount of service, but in the energy service itself. Based on ef ciency de nition (2), it follows that the price p s per unit of the energy service, given by the ratio of service cost to service amount, is smaller the higher the ef ciency µ is:
We now provide a concise summary of three widely known de nitions of the direct rebound effect that are based on either ef ciency, service price, or energy price elasticities. Using these de nitions and data on fuel ef ciency, fuel prices, distance driven, and fuel consumption for household vehicles originating from German household data, we will estimate each of the three rebound effects. The proofs of the propositions that complement the rebound de nitions are given in the appendix. De , the elasticity of service demand with respect to ef ciency, re ecting the relative change in service demand due to a percentage increase in ef ciency. Proposition 1: Having η µ (s) in hand, we obtain the relative reduction in energy use due to a percentage change of ef ciency:
(4) Only if η µ (s) equals zero, that is, only if there is no direct rebound effect, η µ (e) amounts to −1, indicating that 100 % of the potential energy savings due to an ef ciency improvement can actually be realized. De nition 2: Instead of η µ (s), empirical estimates of the rebound effect are frequently based on −η ps (s), the negative price elasticity of service demand see e.g. BINSWAN-GER (2001) and GREENE et al. (1999) . Major reasons for this preference are that data on energy ef ciency is often unavailable or data provides only limited variation in efciencies. The basis for this de nition is given by the following proposition. Proposition 2: If energy prices p e are exogenous and service demand solely depends on p s , then
(5) That the rebound may be captured by −η ps (s) re ects the fact that the direct rebound effect is, in essence, a price effect, which works through shrinking service prices p s . De nition 3: Empiricalestimatesofthereboundeffectaresometimesnecessarilybased on −η pe (e), the negative energy price elasticity of energy consumption, rather than on 8 −η ps (s), because data on energy consumption and prices is more commonly available than on energy services and service prices. It was this de nition of the rebound that was originally introduced by KHAZZOOM (1980:38) and is also employed by, e. g. , W IRL (1997:30) .
Proposition 3: If the energy ef ciency µ is constant, then
It bears emphasizing that De nitions 2 and 3 are based on the assumption that service demand is solely a function of the energy input e, or alternatively of service price p s , as is the conventional assumption in the literature. Contrasting with function
(1), this assumption implies that service demand is independent of time t, capital k, and other market goods o. In practice, however, more energy ef cient appliances frequently have higher xed costs, but simultaneously reduce operating costs through lower fuel and time requirements, a point to which we return in Section 5. In other words, the possibility that ef ciency improvements also determine other factors such as the time usage required by an energy service, the use of other commodities, or capital cost is not considered.
Methodology
Our empirical methodology proceeds with two principle aims: (1) to compare alternative model speci cations that yield estimates corresponding to each of the three denitions of the rebound effect explicated in the theoretical discussion; (2) to generate these estimates using various panel data estimators that control for the omission of potentially relevant factors varying across observations and over time.
Referring to De nition 1, the rst speci cation regresses the log of monthly kilometers traveled, ln(s), on the log of kilometers traveled per liter, ln(µ), the coef cient of which yields the rebound effect, η µ (s). As control variables, we additionally include the logged price of fuel per liter, ln(p e ), and a set of household-and car-level variables designated by the vector x.
Model 1:
Subscripts i and t are used to denote the observation and time period, respectively.
ξ i denotes an unknown individual-speci c term, and ν it is a random component that varies over individuals and time.
The second model generates estimates of the rebound corresponding to De nition 2, which involves regressing ln(s) on the logged price of fuel per kilometer, ln(p s ), and the vector of control variables x. In this model, the rebound effect is obtained according to Proposition 2 by the negative coef cient of ln(p s ):
Model 2:
Recognizing that p s = pe µ
, and that ln(p s ) = ln(p e ) − ln(µ), it can be seen that the specication of Model 2 is functionally equivalent to that of Model 1. In fact, if we impose the restriction
on Model 1, we exactly get Model 2. Hence, testing the null-hypothesis H 0 using Model 1 allows for a simple examination of whether both models are equivalent. Moreover, the anti-symmetry re ected by H 0 is intuitive: for constant fuel prices p e , raising the energy ef ciency µ should have the same effect on the service price p s , and hence on the distance traveled, as falling fuel prices p e given a constant energy ef ciency µ. Lastly, testing the null is also a test whether p s = pe µ and thus whether the proportionality assumption underlying ef ciency de nition (2) is appropriate.
Corresponding to our third de nition of the rebound effect, the nal speci cation regresses the logged monthly liters of fuel consumed, ln(e), on ln(p e ) and the vector of control variables x.
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Model 3:
According to Propositions 2 and 3, the rebound effect results from the negative of the price coef cient: η µ (s) = −η pe (e) = −α pe . It also bears noting that it is possible to examine whether Model 3 differs from Model 2 by testing the hypothesis
on the basis of the estimates of Model 3 and, additionally, by testing the hypothesis
on the basis of the estimates of Model 2. Only if both hypotheses were to hold, Model 2 and 3 would be identical, as can be seen by inserting restriction (11) into model formulation (10) and employing ef ciency de nition (2), µ = s/e, and relationship (3),
Of course, if one of these hypotheses is rejected, it follows that Model 3 and Model 1 are also not identical.
Panel data affords three principle approaches for econometric modeling: the xed-, between-, and random effects estimators. The key advantage of using the xed-effects estimator is that it produces consistent estimates even in the presence of time-invariant, unobservable factors (e.g. topography and urban form) that vary across observations and are correlated with the explanatory variables. This is a particularly useful feature for the analysis of the present data set given that we lack information on household income. To the extent that income remains relatively stable over the three-year survey period, its in uence will be captured by the xed effects.
In contrast to the xed-effects estimator, in which dummy variables are included to capture the time-invariant, unobservable factors ξ i that vary across observations, random effects treats these factors as part of the disturbances, thereby assuming that their correlation with the regressors is zero. If this assumption is met, the randomeffects estimator is a viable alternative, as it confers the advantage of greater ef ciency over the xed-effects estimator. Violation of the assumption, however, implies biased estimates.
While most analyses neglect between effects, instead focusing on the choice between xed and random effects, we see merit in applying all three estimators to the three model speci cations. For starters, our relatively short panel of three years means that some of the regressors may have insuf cient variability to be precisely estimated using xed effects, a problem that does not af ict between effects given its reliance on cross-sectional information. Beyond this, the between-effects estimator, which is equivalent to an OLS regression of averages across time, conveys valuable economic content that is not otherwise revealed, telling us the cross-sectional effects of changes in an explanatory variable between subjects. Last but equally important, we distinguish between xed and random effects using a test that, in essence, is based on the comparison of the xed-and between effects.
This test is a slight variation of the HAUSMAN test commonly employed to test the null hypothesis that the xed-effects are equal to the random-effects, which, if not rejected, would suggest adoption of the random-effects estimator due to its higher efciency. Yet, testing the hypothesis that the xed-and the random effects are equal is numerically identical to testing that the between-and xed effects are equal see e. g. BALTAGI 2005:67 and thus that the inter-temporal within-subject effects are the same as the cross-sectional effects across subjects. As there is rarely a theoretical basis for this assumption, it must not be surprising if the null hypothesis of the HAUSMAN test is not found to withstand empirical scrutiny.
Exploiting the equivalence of between-and xed effects under the null, we thus implement modi ed versions of our Models 1 to 3 that easily allow us to examine both the equality of the xed-and between coef cients for individual variables as well as that of the whole range of coef cients (see Proposition 4 of the appendix). Chi square tests can then be used to determine for which variables the assumption of equivalence holds and which variables require separate speci cation of the xed-and between effects. Using, say, Model 3, testing the null of the standard HAUSMAN test on the basis of the following speci cation,
translates to examining
Estimated using the random-effects estimator, speci cation (13) retrieves the entire set of xed-and between-effects estimates, where α we and α wx designate the xed-effects coef cients and α be and α bx the between-effects coef cients.
The German Mobility Panel Data Set
The data used in this research is drawn from the German Mobility Although income is not directly measured, an attempt is made to proxy for its in uence via measures of the number of employed residents and the number with a high school diploma living in the household. Finally, controls are included for household size, the presence of children, whether the household undertook a vacation with the car during the survey period, and whether any employed member of the household changed jobs in the preceding year. ! The price series was de ated using a consumer price index for Germany obtained from D-56)615 (2007) . " We also tested for quality-dependent rebound effects by interacting the ef ciency measure with the luxury dummy, but found this to be insigni cant in all of the speci cations. 
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Empirical Results
Our empirical analysis of the data involved the estimation of two sets of models, one in which the individual-speci c component was speci ed at the level of the household and one in which it was speci ed at the level of the automobile. Noting that this distinction had little bearing on the qualitative conclusions of the analysis, the following discussion focuses on the estimates generated at the household level. This focus facilitates comparison of the three estimators as it ensures that each uses the same sample of observations. Were the individual component set at the level of the automobile, then observations in which the household changes automobiles from one year to the next would drop out in the case of the xed-effects estimator.
# Table 2 presents estimates corresponding to De nition 1 of the rebound effect, in which fuel ef ciency is regressed on the distance driven using xed-, between-, and random-effects estimators. Several features of the results bear highlighting. First, we con rm that the impact of ef ciency improvements on traveled distance is of the same order as the effect of fuel prices: As reported in the nal row of the table, upon testing the null-hypothesis H 0 : α µ = −α pe , we cannot reject the anti-symmetry given by H 0 for any of the estimation techniques. Hence, there is no reason, neither on a theoretical nor an empirical basis, to assume that Model 1 and 2 are principally different, implying the conclusion that it is equally well-founded to estimate the direct rebound effect on the basis of either De nition (Model) 1 or De nition (Model) 2. Second, the estimated rebound effects are considerably higher than most estimates reported elsewhere in the literature, and suggest that some 58 % of the potential energy savings due to an efciency improvement is lost to increased driving. Finally, these effects are of a strikingly similar magnitude across the three estimators, differing by less than a percentage point.
This similarity does not hold for many of the remaining coef cients. A particularly stark difference is seen for the effect of the number of employed household members, which has a counterintuitive and negative coef cient in the xed-effects model, but is positive in the between-and random-effects models. All else equal, we would expect that a greater number of employed persons in the household would increase the dependency on the automobile. The negative xed effects estimate is dif cult to interpret, but may be the result of temporary disruptions associated with changes in the household labor force that reduce automobile travel.
The remaining control variables have either intuitive effects or are statistically insigni cant. Referencing the random-effects coef cients, older cars are seen to be driven less, while premium cars are driven more. Another important determinant is whether a vacation with the car was undertaken over the survey period, which results in a roughly 35% (= exp(0.30) -1) increase in distance traveled. Aside from the fuel price # Roughly 18% of households changed cars at least once over the three years of the survey. and the number of employed household members, this is the only control variable also found to be signi cant in the xed-effects model. We also explored models in which time dummies were included to control for autonomous changes in the macroeconomic environment. As these were found to be jointly insigni cant across all of the models estimated, they were excluded from the nal speci cations. Not unexpectedly, a HAUSMAN test rejects the null hypothesis that the xed-and random-effects coef cients are jointly equal for all signi cance levels. Whether this result therefore implies that equality fails to hold for each of the variables individually is, however, not immediately clear. To pursue this issue further, we estimated the model in equation (13) and proceeded to test the equality restrictions using individual chisquare tests, the results for which are presented in the nal column of Table 2 . These ndings con rm what was already evident from casual inspection: the difference between the xed-and between-effects estimates of the rebound effect are statistically insigni cant. In fact, this conclusion applies to several of the other explanatory variables, with the one clear exception being the number of employed people in the household. Table 3 presents estimates of the rebound effect corresponding to De nition 2, based on a regression of distance traveled on the price of fuel per kilometer. As expected, the overall pattern is similar to that of Table 2 . Again, the estimated rebound effects are high, roughly on the order of 59%. The remaining coef cient estimates are also similar to the rst speci cation. The HAUSMAN test rejects equality of the xed-and randomeffects models for all signi cance levels. The only variable for which differences are clearly evident at the 1% level is again the number of employed household members. Table 4 presents estimates of the rebound effect based on De nition 3, which is distinguished by the use of total fuel consumption as the dependent variable and the price of fuel per liter as the key regressor. That this model is not identical to Models 1 or 2 is con rmed by the rejection of the null hypotheses that the price coef cients in Models 3 and 2 are both -1. Despite these differences, the estimates in Table 4 are remarkably similar to those of Tables 3 and 2 , albeit with a larger range across the xedand between-effects estimators. In this instance, the estimated rebound effect is seen to vary between 57% and 67%; but even here we cannot reject the hypothesis that the coef cients are equal based on the chi square test. Likewise, with the exception of the number of employed household members and the dummy indicating a car vacation, the other coef cients also appear to be equal despite the rejection of the HAUSMAN test for all signi cance levels.
We thus conclude that although our estimates of the rebound effect are high, they appear to be robust to both the estimator and the speci cation. Whether the model controls for time-invariant factors that vary across cases (as with the xed effects estimator) or case-invariant factors that vary over time (as with the between effects estimator) has no substantial impact on the key results. Perhaps even more notable is the similarity of the estimates corresponding to De nition 3 with those of De nitions 1 and 2.
While the latter de nitions incorporate ef ciency either directly via the kilometers per liter traveled or indirectly via the service price per kilometer, De nition 3 relies exclusively on the price mechanism, suggesting that this information can serve as a useful substitute in the absence of data on technology. It also bears noting that in the appendix we distinguish between short-run and long-run rebound effects by estimating variants of our models that, as in WALKER AND WIRL (1993:185) , include the lagged value of the dependent variable as a regressor. As is to be expected, the short-run effect directly obtained from the coef cient estimate of the lagged variable is smaller than the long-run rebound effect, registering nearly a two-fold increase in magnitude. Interestingly, the estimates of the rebound effects presented in Tables 2 to 4 are located somewhere in between the short-and long-run effects reported in the appendix. A few caveats should be recognized, perhaps the strongest of which is the assumption that automobile ef ciency is exogenous. If, for example, individuals who drive more also select more fuel ef cient vehicles, then we might expect an upward bias imparted on the rebound effect estimated by the coef cients of ln(µ) and ln(p s ).
However, there are two reasons why we do not deem endogeneity to be a serious concern here. First, any time-invariant unobservable factors that would otherwise induce 20 correlation between the rebound effect and the error term (e.g. proximity to public transit, environmental attitudes) will be captured by the xed effects model. Although we cannot exclude the possibility of relevant time-variant unobservables, we believe the range of included explanatory variables -the presence of young children, job changes, and the number of employed -provides reasonably good coverage of temporal changes whose absence could induce biases. Second, endogeneity problems relating to vehicle choice would not be expected to af ict the estimates from De nition 3 in Table   4 , as these are based on the price of fuel. The fact that these estimates are of roughly the same magnitude as those from De nitions 1 and 2 provides some con rmation that any upward bias from endogeneity is negligible. Although increased ef ciency confers economic bene ts in its own right, its effectiveness in reducing fuel consumption and pollution depends on how consumers alter behavior in response to cheaper per-unit energy prices due to improved ef ciency. To the extent that service demand increases via rebound effects, gains in reducing environmental impacts and energy dependency will be offset. The results presented in this paper, based on the analysis of a German household panel, suggest that the size of this offset is potentially quite large, varying between 57% and 67%. Stated alternatively, the relative reduction in energy use due to a percentage change in ef ciency is on the order of 33% to 43%.
While these estimates are considerably higher than those found elsewhere in the literature, with most empirical evidence originating from the U.S., our results are ro- As this is one of the few studies to be conducted on this issue in a European context, it would be of interest to see whether the qualitative ndings presented here are corroborated by studies using other data sets from within Germany and other European countries. If this is found to be the case, it would suggest that policy interventions targeted at technological ef ciency -be they voluntary agreements or command and control measures -may have only muted effects in reducing fuel consumption. At the very least, our results indicate that the current emphasis on ef ciency as the principal means for policy-makers to address environmental challenges (see e.g. BMU 2007) may be misplaced. Given the strong responses to prices found here, price-based instruments such as fuel taxes would appear to be a more effective policy measure. 
23
